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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the audience with a point of view perspective 
regarding the evolution of circumstances that lead to the formation of terrorist networks, 
organized crime, illicit activities, (etc.), and to present how these criminals utilize money 
laundering schemes to further their respective positions in society from a socio-economic 
perspective. Subsequently, this paper discusses how terrorists and/or organized crime 
members utilize weak nation-state infrastructures to capitalize on money-laundering 
schemes; thereby, using the debilitating effects of financial crimes to keep nation-state 
institutions in a perpetual condition of instability. The ultimate aim of the criminal/illicit 
behavior and activities is to create, refine and execute more efficient ways to further their 
respective cause placing themselves in positions that yield even greater power over the 
systems they continually exploit. Ultimately, these criminals continue to exploit the 
weaknesses of the nation-state infrastructures to gain and maintain a decisive advantage 
over society at large if left unchallenged. 
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A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this analysis is to help address U.S. and international community 
concerns regarding the transnational need for adequate understanding of the 
characteristics of failed nation-states. This brief analysis generally focuses on particular 
states or regions to illustrate indicators and causal factors of failed nation-states, such as 
money laundering. The shared need to ensure foreign and security policy goals are met to 
ensure that personal and economic security is secured for generations to come is 
imperative. 
The scope of this analysis is to consider the capability of stability operations 
across the entire spectrum of nation-state conflict from direct action and historical case 
data. To accomplish this objective, it is first necessary to examine the specific 
characteristics indicative of state failure that can assist stability/reconstruction operations 
regarding tactical, operational, and strategic executions of their duties in at-risk 
environments. This analysis allows those with a vested interest in issues concerning the 
at-risk nature of failing or failed states to access more resources; thus, enabling the 
formulation of policy/strategy necessary to nation-state success world-wide.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Regardless of whether state-failure bases its origins on civilizations accustomed to 
the tenants of colonialism or innately “separate” cultures having been integrated into new 
states not based on common identities, the nation-state continues to fail in many ways 
(Spielvogel, 2002). This research arises from a need to identify which currently stable 
nation-states have the greatest likelihood of becoming unstable or failed do to degrading 
socio-economic factors, such as collusion and money laundering. Further, this research 
seeks to identify through cost-to-interest analysis, levels of state (and other) interest and 
its corresponding cost expenditure at that particular level. These research findings can be 
utilized as a tool by the U.S. government, NGOs, and other organizations, to determine or 
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prioritize the allocation of funding and other resources better throughout the various 
stages of state failure based upon the current and/or foreseeable indicators of the 
respective state.  
C RESEARCH QUESTION 
What conceptual and theoretical approaches are most useful in helping identify 
which currently stable nation-states have the greatest likelihood of becoming unstable?  
D. NESTED RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Conducting this analysis addresses the following questions. 
• Which internationally accepted at-risk or failed state risk factors are 
predominately identified in state failures? 
• Which regime types are historically prone to state-failure?  
• What cumulative social identity types are significant to various levels of 
state failure?  
• Is there a relationship between state interest and level of stability 
effort/mission funding?  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The author’s analysis utilizes “Game Theory,” personal construct theoretical 
framework, and other socio-psychological approaches to develop strategies to help 
identify which currently stable nation-states have the greatest likelihood of becoming 
unstable. Kelly identifies and utilizes the personal construct approach to draw from 
habitual patterns and distinctive qualities of and individual’s physical and mental 
expressions to distinguish individuality (Burger, 2000). He states that people continually 
“generate and test hypotheses about their worlds.” This innate trait is suggested to be a 
mechanism that people utilize to predict what one believes can happen. Additionally, this 
theory asserts that personal constructs that individuals tend to keep are suspected to be 
the ones that prove most useful. Ultimately, the retained constructs are subsequently 
considered as valid templates in forming individual attitudes. 
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Like-minded individuals tend to migrate towards other individuals or peer groups 
that share their inclination to move or act in a particular direction or way consistent with 
similar disposition(s) to some action or end-state. Again, this type of corroboration 
maintains or allows for the provisions for advancements in personal or institutional 
goals/objectives. 
As succeeding generations cultivate or grow a society as a whole through the 
previously delineated mechanisms, it is possible to see how a clear pattern is exhibited 
towards the support of a characteristic decreased government and increased personal 
interests. The inherent nature of such an organization is typically to gain influence and 
control for those with already increasingly large holdings and not to maintain the concept 
of long-term identity. This being stated, it can be seen how the negligent mismanagement 
of the aforementioned independent variables can lead to deficiencies that ultimately 
translate into poor government and subsequent failed statehood. 
Basic conditions of statehood inadequately tended to and/or consistently 
miscalculated, again, tend to lead to failure. Some common provisions indicative of 
internationally accepted standards of statehood are listed with the Fund for Peace as “The 
Twelve Indicators of State Vulnerability” (Fund for Peace, 2009). Here, these indicators 
are used as a gauge to measure a state’s vulnerability to collapse or conflict. Attention is 
given to the primary categories of social indicators, economic indicators, political 
indicators, and violation of human rights. The primary categories further delineate 
examples of circumstances that may occur in each of the respective categories.  
For this research project (for instructional/illustrative purposes), the author plans 
to focus on the variable instability indicator, such as criminalization/delegitimization of 
the state and its financial institutions through money laundering, as it relates to the 
critical state of infrastructural well being of a nation. Many other variable indicators can 
be used in replace of money laundering to identify nation-state infrastructure conditions 
of a particular state. Again, the assumption is that high instances of money laundering 
indicate low efficiency of financial institutions and its relative costs to society thereof. 
Degradation of financial systems can lead to uneven distribution of wealth within a 
particular social setting. Unrest, civil disobedience, and subsequent criminal 
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incidents/attacks occur within these settings, costing the local (as well as international 
communities) millions of dollars. Index Mundi, a detailed resource for country statistics, 
charts and maps compiled from multiple sources, such as the CIA Factbook, states that 
there is a 0.2% increase in degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in 
Peru from 2009–2010 (Gini Index 49.8 to 52, respectively). This rate is often used as an 
indicator of a level of economic health in Peru during the stated timeframe (Index Mundi, 
2009). The author, provided this information and his assignment of valued cost to wealth 
distribution, plans on providing resource information that assists officials in their 
identification and allocation of nation-state interest projects for funding. Ntalaja and 
Everaers (2004) define measures for similar areas of governance that can detect 
irregularities within a government. Associates for the RAND Corporation (2009) created 
a publication for the effective navigation of post-conflict environment and suggestions 
for the proper use of resources thereof. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The intent is to analyze existing principles, survey data, and commonly accepted 
practices in order to determine whether adequate factual information exists to support a 
conclusion that an appropriate relationship occurs between personal construct, empathy 
(social theory), social action (collusion/violent acts/illicit behavior), internationally 
recognized state failure indicator analysis, and subsequent state failure. From that 
analysis, interest (U.S. government/NGOs/other) is identified and an approximate cost-to-
interest analysis done to weigh levels of state instability to actual cost.  
This thesis reviews case studies concerning money laundering, socio-economic 
effects, state instability/failure operations, and interest-to-cost analysis involving the 
same to provide anecdotal evidence where applicable and to highlight and discuss 
potential antecedent conditions that enhance the effectiveness of failed-state response. 
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II. GAME THEORY 
A. GENERIC GAME: COLLUSIVE ACTS/CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES—
SIMULATED CASES OF PERU, SIERRA LEONE, AND RUSSIA 
This section of the thesis utilizes “Game Theory” and socio-psychological 
theories as utility tools to access and analyze available historical data concerning stable, 
at-risk, and failed nation-states; thereby, providing supplemental resources to U.S. 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGO) enabling them, and others, 
further resources when dealing with prevention, sustainment, and reconstruction policy 
and practice efforts, as a whole, in state failure. The overall assertion is that permissive 
environments lead to higher levels of criminal acts and collusive activities; subsequently, 
leading to nation-state deterioration and instability. Various pay-off scenarios are 
explored in this problem to illustrate. 
Various reports and assessments were utilized to assess the stability and political 
risk of countries by focusing on key economic, social, and political indicators, including 
as applicable, their relations with other countries in the region and local issues.  
Research associates from various organizations dealing with state conflict and 
sustainable development estimate that due to time and labor involved, the cost of creating 
a new country assessment starts at $5,000 (Fund for Peace, 2009). Adequate reports, 
surveys, and other publications are available concerning state-failure and suggested 
indicators and causes.  
B. GENERAL/HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO INFORMATION FOR 
PROJECT PURPOSES 
• Level of nation-state stability in relationship to number of laundering 
incidents/attacks 
• Stable—1 laundering incident/attack 
• Weak—3 laundering incident/attacks 
• Failing—6 laundering incident/attacks 
• Failed—10 laundering incident/attacks 
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• Prevent Attack/Build City 
• Players: 
• Player 1: Governments of the developed world (U.S., 
Europe.) 
• Player 2: Governments of the developing world (Peru, 
Sierra Leone, Russia 
• Generic Situation 
• An investment of $2 billion is needed to stop attacks. 
• It can produce an economic benefit of $12 billion, which is to be 
split equally between the players. 
• If the investment is not made, there economic losses can reach $12 
billion, which is to be split equally between the players. 
• If both parties agree to contribute, each need only invest $1 billion. 
• If only one party contributes, it must invest $2 billion. 
**Game Theory Sample problem derived from Model Conflicts SO4410 
course instruction at NPS, as well as from sample Schecter/Zeeman/Iams 
“Global Warming” sample problem guide. 
• Monies for Reconstruction & Stabilization Efforts 
• $323,272,000.00 Total Civilian Stabilization Initiative 
• $106,400,000.00 to recon/stab  
• Seven countries per fiscal year 
• American Academy of Actuaries insured losses (relatively same 
sized/populated foreign cities/nations can be substituted) 
 
City/State Population 
New York, NY 8,400,000 
Washington, D.C. 595,000 
San Francisco, CA  824,525 
Des Moines, IA 197,000 
 
City Attack/Incident Cost  
per Billion per Person 
New York 1 Billion/700K = 1,428.60/person  
(17,143.2/12 Billion) 
Washington, D.C. 1B/99,167 = 10,084/person 
San Francisco 1B/91,667 = 10,909/person 
Des Moines 1B/65,667 = 15,228/person  
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1. Scenarios 




Developed world invest (1, 1)  (0, 2) 
 refuse (2, 0)  (−2, −2) 
 







Developed world invest (1, 1)  (0, 2) 
 refuse  (2, 0)  (−2, −2) 
 
Here, “additional noneconomic payoffs important to the governments of the 
developed world are investigated: 
• If the governments of the developed world agree to invest, they receive 
approval from their citizens and the rest of the world that they value at $1 
billion.  
• If the governments of the developed world refuse to invest, they receive 
condemnation from their citizens and the rest of the world that they value 
at −$1 billion” (Schecter, Zeeman, Iams; SO4410 NPS).  
b. Incentive Scenario 





Developed world invest (2, 1)  (1, 2) 




a. Dominant Strategies  
One player’s strategies dominate another if it gives the person a better 
payoff against any choices of strategies by the other player.  





Developed world invest (1, 1)  (0, 2) 
 refuse   (2, 0)  (−2, −2) 
 
-No Strategies dominate here. 





Developed world invest (2, 1)  (1, 2) 
 refuse   (1, 0)  (−3, −2) 
 
-Dominate strategy (“A”) here. 
b. Strategic Moves 
Defining criteria for strategic movies is as follows. 
• “A” represents the Developed World’s strategic move to contribute to 
foreign nation-state stability. 
• “B” represents the Developed World’s strategic move to not contribute to 
foreign nation-state stability. 
• “C” represents the Developing World’s strategic move to contribute to 
foreign nation-state stability. 
• “D” represents the Developing World’s strategic move to not contribute to 
foreign nation-state stability. 
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• A dominant strategy exists for Developed World to contribute to foreign 
nation-state stability. 
• No dominant strategy exists for Developing World. 
• A Nash Equilibrium occurs at (1, 2) during a pure strategy game. 
• The likely outcome without communication would be (1, 2). 
From the perspective of the Developed World (D’ed W), next to be 
determined is if there is a First Move (open communications between Developed World 
and Developing World). 
• Should Developed World move first: 
• If D’ed W. does A, then the D’ing W. does D, implies outcome (1, 
2) 
• If D’ed W. does B, then the D’ing W. does C, implies outcome (1, 
0) 
• Thus, the D’ed W. chooses outcome (1,0); the better option from 
their perspective. It is does not increase their position from (1, 2) 
but does decrease the position of D’ing W., which subsequently, 
puts D’ed W. in a better position. 
• Should Developed World force the Developing World to move first: 
• If D’ing W. does C, then the D’ed W. does A, implies outcome (2, 
1) 
• If D’ing W. does D, then the D’ed W. does A, implies outcome (1, 
2) 
• The D’ed W. moving first results in outcome (1, 0), and forcing the 
D’ing W. to move first results in (1, 2). Forcing the D’ing W. to 
move first empirically puts the D’ing W. in a slightly better 
position (1, 2) than the D’ed W.’‘s first move (1, 0); however, 
neither has a first move that benefits either any better than the 
likely outcome without communication (1, 2). 
Next to be ascertained is if either has a viable threat (hurts both) to issue 
the other. The D’ed W. wants the D’ing W. to play C, so they threaten D. If D’ing W. 
does D and the D’ed W. does the opposite of what it logically should do (hurting itself), 
then D’ed does B, yielding outcome (−3, −2). Now normally, if D’ing W. does D, then 
D’ed W. (helping itself) does A, yielding outcome (1, 2). Thus, it can be seen that, yes, 
D’ed W. has the option of a threat. The previous moves hurt both D’ed W. and D’ing W. 
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Confirming the threat option, the following is noted. If D’ing W. does D, 
then D’ed W. does B, implies outcome (−3, −2). If D’ing W. does C, then D’ed W. does 
A, implies outcome (2, 1). Thus, it can be seen here that, yes, the threat works because 
D’ing W. chooses C just as the D’ed W. wanted. 
Checking to see if D’ed W. can issue a promise (hurt itself, help D’ing 
W.), the following is found (with the understanding that D’ed W. wants D’ing W. to play 
C). If the D’ing W. does C, then D’ed W. (hurting itself) does B, the outcome yields (1, 
0). However, if D’ing W. does C, then D’ed W. (optimizing for itself as it normally 
would) does A, outcome is (2, 1). Thus, there is no promise because, although the moves 
hurts D’ed W., it also hurts D’ing W. Again, there is no promise. 
Summarizing the analysis thus far, note that the D’ed W. has a viable 
threat, but does not have a first move, promise, or combination. The D’ing W.’s first 
move (if taken (1, 2) is better than D’ed W.’s (1, 0) first move if taken); however, neither 
has a move that is better than the likely outcome of (1, 2) without communication. 
C. SECURITY LEVEL 
It has been seen that the only strategy thus far is that D’ed W. can benefit 
unilaterally by threatening D’ing W. Next, each player’s security levels is analyzed. The 
objective is for the player being analyzed to maximize its outcome while its opponent 
tries to minimize the other’s outcome. The security value is what remains from the 
respective game’s analysis. 
 





Developed world invest (2)  (1) 





Here, the D’ed W. is trying to maximize its outcome and the D’ing W. is trying to 
minimize the D’ed W.’s outcome. In this scenario, (played alone) both have dominant 
strategies: D’ed W. has an “A” strategy and D’ing W. has a “C” strategy. The Nash 






Developed world invest (1)  (2) 
 refuse   (0)  (−2) 
 
Next, D’ing W.’s game is evaluated when played alone. Here, the D’ing W. is 
trying to maximize its outcome and the D’ed W. is trying to minimize D’ing W.’s 
outcome. D’ing W. has no dominant strategy in this scenario. The D’ed W. has a 
dominant strategy of B. D’ing W.’s security level is 0 and a Prudential Strategy of C.  
Looked at from an individually played perspective, note that the security levels of 
the D’ed and D’ing W.s are (1, 0), respectively. 
In closing, regardless of whether society wants to admit its existence, a 
relationship exists between needs, attitude, action, and subsequent instability and failed 
statehood, which should be thoroughly reviewed and understood when making policy and 
strategy regarding organized revolt and state failure. Further, it is very important to be 
able to see these relationships to mitigate the many challenges that accompany any 
organized revolt and state instability. Miscalculation can lead to the failure of key battle 
strategies. Inaccurate interpretation, and even blatant neglect of state instability or an 
adversary’s structural and strategic intentions, can also lead to terminal outcomes. The 
insurgency, in general, requires the support of the population in the form of people, guns, 
and money. It continuously attempts to impose upon and solidify controlling relationships 
over the people; all the while, manipulating equality for its own benefit. The state 
attempts to gain an information advantage to detect and engage the counter-state. Both 
are waging their respective battles in calculated progressions. It is a dynamic struggle 
within an ambiguous administrative body—both sides fighting for the most accurate 
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feedbacks from the indigenous population; both sides contending for optimal control of 
the state. The author asserts that by utilizing Game Theory modeling as a resource tool to 
assess/calculated losses of prevalent areas/issues of nation-state instability accurately, 
societies can create effective policies and regulations to decrease the symptom indicator 
variables drastically and permanently that lead to state failure as a whole. This, in turn, 
can generate more productive citizens in their respective societies, as well as a more 
receptive international community to their trade ideas. One step at a time; the world can 
continue to strive more effectively to become a better place for everyone to live.  
D. RESEARCH PLAN 
• Historical 
• Laundering or other incidents that contribute to Peru, Sierra Leone, 
and/or Russia becoming weak, failing, and failed. 
• Select scope of empirical observation (countries most likely to fail 
i.e., Peru/Sierra Leone/Russia).  
• Compare/contrast and illustrate research data utilizing Game 
Theory and general data analysis.  
• Surveys—Looking for indicators of the following. 
• UND Human Development Index 
• Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
• Freedom House’s Freedom of the World Report 
• Fund for Peace Failed State Indicators 
• Political Instability Task Force Report  
• Mathematical Model (Linear Program Optimization)  
• Develop a value system (utility theory) to compare various 
situations/incidents of money laundering against the relative social 
cost.  
• The principle modeling is the development of a value system. 
• Utilizing this model as a resource contributor that assists in decreasing 
money laundering/collusion rates of the following. 
• Peru, Sierra Leone, and Russia and their respective incidents of 
money laundering/collusion over a given period. 
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• Utilizing this model as a resource contributor that assists in decreasing 
nation-state instability due to high levels of money laundering to 
instability indictor ratio (Fund for Peace data, National Counter Terrorism 
Data): 
• Countries moving from instability to relative stability 
• Angola (11 laundering incidents/collusion acts/attacks; 
pop.: 17,000,000) 
• Liberia (six laundering incidents/collusion acts/attacks; 
pop.: 3,490,000) 
• Rwanda (10 laundering incidents/collusion acts/attacks; 
pop.: 10,180,000) 
• From Relative Stability to Instability 
• Cote d’Ivoire (31; pop.: 18,900,000) 
• Chad (40; pop.: 10,330,000) 
• High Risk Countries that Have thus Far Avoided Civil War 
• Guinea (three; pop.: 10,058,000) 
• Zimbabwe (19; pop.: 8,500,000) 
E. CONCLUSION 
• Intend to verify the following. 
• Collective empathies/actions leading to failed/failing statehood 
often develop from conditions of uneven wealth distribution, 
poverty or extreme want. 
• Needs hierarchy can be associated with personal constructs, 
actions, and failed statehood.  
• Utility theory can be utilized to identify probabilities associated 
with attitudes historically leading to destructive action and 
subsequent failed statehood. 
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III. TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 
People, arguably, want their lives to be as orderly, safe, and predictable as 
possible. In general, citizens of a particular social regime remain relatively complacent 
regarding rules and regulations as set forth by the incumbent regime so long as their basic 
needs are being met by that regime’s administration. History often provides the illusion 
that as long as the basic physiological and safety needs of a particular population are 
considerably and consistently being met, its citizens generally remain satisfied with the 
status quo; or the way things are; or how it is… at least until they are confronted with a 
need to “put the issue of political change on the public agenda” (Crenshaw, pp. 7–20). 
Martha Crenshaw states, “extremists seek either a radical change in the status quo, which 
would confer a new advantage, or the defense of privileges they perceive to be 
threatened” (Crenshaw, pp. 7–20). Maintaining the status quo, per se, as a relative 
strategy, is arguably not very difficult. It may be pragmatically integrated into 
governance measures often as a means for elected officials to control the development of 
the respective society democratically. As a whole, when citizens consistently perceive 
that governing institutions generally make provisions to mitigate their concerns for safety 
and various other issues pertaining to the preservation of their basic needs within a social 
network structure, their typical tendency is uniformly to remain amicable to the 
conditions as set for by policies of that governing administration. To put it bluntly, 
regimes understand that people (overall) tend to go with the flow when they are basically 
content. These regimes, thus, strive to create policies that meet basic social needs that 
influence various levels of a citizen’s satisfaction and complacency regarding social 
circumstances, and with respect to, that administration’s governing body (Gui & 
Costopoulos, pp. 119–129).  
Regardless of whether ideological, political, religious issues exist within a 
society, if there is a continual neglect and mismanaged of the grievance resolutions, the 
respective social networks become increasingly dissatisfied. This has been historically 
seen in many nation-states fouled with corrupt and inadequate leadership. Both the  
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regime and the social groups are organized arrangements of interrelated elements of 
society that form a larger, entity, which in this case, is the institution of the state and/or 
counter-state system.  
The author asserts that the world would witness the development of fewer terrorist 
networks if every country were an established and functioning democracy. These 
functioning democracies would tend to serve required infrastructural frameworks better 
that would efficiently mitigate corruption/collusion between illicit industries and persons, 
money laundering schemes and other crimes, such as terrorist financing. Ultimately, 
nations would subsequently be more capable of applying more suitable measures towards 
the improvement of its stability.  
The author’s assertion stems from the analysis of historical data and social 
indicators made available by/through various academic institutions, research facilities, 
and scholars, to facilitate the measure of internationally accepted socio-cultural standards. 
These data are made available to better quantify nation-state stability/instability and 
subsequent development of terrorist networks activity and money laundering as a whole. 
The indicators can be correlated to civil disapproval of regime and subsequent other 
factors escalating into violent acts of terrorism through the exploitation of various 
networks. Again, when the state fails to meet the basic needs of its inhabitants, the 
unanimity of the citizens’ desire to support the regime breaks. Their support for the 
incumbent leaders often transitions to the growth and maintenance of a rebellion with 
subsequent acts of terrorism. However, before investigating the evolution of civil-regime 
commitment, it is first necessary to define terrorism and democracy, and then state how 
they relate.  
A. TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY DEFINED AND CORRELATED 
The United States Code (the governing law for the United States) title 22, Ch. 38, 
Para. 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 




(U.S. Code, 2009). Democracy is defined as either a political government executed by the 
people (direct democracy) or the power to govern is granted to the elected representatives 
(representative democracy) (WikiDemoracy, 2009).  
Utilizing their Global Model to identify factors associated with the risk of all 
types of state failure in all countries, the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) found that “the 
strongest influence on the risk of state failure” was regime type (SFTF, 2000). 
Additionally, the task force also found “the odds of state failure to be seven times as high 
for partial democracies as they were for full democracies and autocracies” (full 
democracies and autocracies have roughly equivalent odds of failing) (SFTF, 2000, p. 
34).  
Full democracies/autocracies typically have stronger leaders and more effective 
legislatures than countries with partial democracies. Limits on free speech, uneven 
wealth/property distribution, unfair voting and fraudulent election procedures are other 
characteristics prevalent in nations with higher tendencies of failure. Prime examples of 
ineffective governments are the Fujimori Regime in Peru and South Africa’s Apartheid 
(SFTF, 2000, p. 34). 
Given the historical data, it can been seen that the longevity of partial or other 
democratic hybrid regime types are relatively short lived. This being said, effective 
mechanisms for monitoring the consistency of partial democracies should be strictly and 
vigilantly the focus of regime officials observing their institutions for trends towards state 
failure (SFTF, 2000, p. 34). SFTF reports that effective lawmaking legislature’s 
capabilities and “executive constraining” powers are the most discernible differences 
between the characteristics of full and partial democracies (p. 36). 
Generally speaking, when social contracts are not met by the regime (which is 
typically the case in failing or failed non democracies), citizens become increasingly 
frustrated, displeased, and ultimately, become detached from their perceived 
responsibilities to the regime’s administration. Feelings of indignation begin to arise as 
the society develops feelings of having been wronged (Kraut, 1986, p. 642). When the 
administration’s formal grievance process is tested and found to be inadequate, civil 
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unrest occurs; further placing strain on the regime’s already diminishing capacity. 
Finally, the regime’s negligence, violence, or inability to provide for society’s basic 
human needs reaches a point where many of the frustrated social group begins to resort to 
taking illegal independent or group action. Depending on the level of frustration or wrong 
considered to have been committed by the regime’s administration, the participants of the 
civil unrest may further escalate into committing acts of terror as a means of coercing the 
sought after change. An evolution of citizen approval and disapproval of regime follows 
to depict this assertion further. 
B. CAUSES AND CONDUCT 
1. Evolution of Citizen Trust, Approval of Regimes 
In his book “Trust,” sociologist Professor Piotr Sztompka provides his theoretical 
model for trust as it fundamentally relates to the actions of mankind (Sztompka, 1999). 
As he defines various functional and foundational elements of trust, one can clearly see 
how parties involved in trust networks navigate within the complex subtleties of rational 
reasoning regarding their conceptions of an individual’s competencies, reliabilities, 
and/or level of honesty as it reflects that individual’s trust and support of a network 
(Sztompka, 1999). Sztompka utilizes empirical data to show how cultures of trust 
develop, specifically by discussing instances of growth in countries like Poland after the 
collapse of communism (Sztompka, 1999). Steve Ressler further supports previous 
assertions of network development with his description of how these “complex” yet 
“simple” networks “form the structural basis of many natural events, organizations, and 
social processes” (Sztompka, 1999). Both Ressler and Barabasi agree that the basis of 
social network analysis is “that individual nodes … are connected by complex yet 
understandable relationships that form networks (Sztompka, 1999; Barabasi, 2002). 
These relationships are key in the development of various levels of trust, which 
subsequently evolve into networks. In their publication, “The MiTT and Its “Human 




building a relationship as being respect, relationship, trust, and team (McConnell, 2007). 
His assertion is that patience must be maintained throughout the entire process, which 
“ultimately builds a team” concept among its members (McConnell, 2007).  
2. Social Discontent, Disapproval of Regimes and Formation of Terrorist 
Networks 
Most participants of a particular social group or network, through birth or other 
means, thoroughly understand that by their generally lawful adherence to the governing 
statutes of the incumbent network and varying regimes, comes the assurance of certain 
civil-privileges and protections. However, when the onset of mainstream industrialism 
from the late 19th through 20th centuries brought about dramatic social and economic 
changes throughout many societies, a redefining of the status quo also occurred 
(Spielvogel, 2002). Material possession, for the most part, had long been the measure of 
social relevance among citizens, and with relevance comes acceptance, and with 
acceptance, comes privilege, regardless of how undue those privileges may have been. 
Many citizens maintained silence in many instances of inequity, settling for the social 
divisions brought about by the industrial change; however, discontent subtly lingered as 
the rich got richer, bringing about further class restrictions and subsequent subjugation of 
the less fortunate. While the elite, so to speak, enjoyed a time of comfort and luxury, 
continuous structural and functional changes within the various social settings occurred 
(Spielvogel, 2002).  
Niall Ferguson discusses just how destabilizing economic growth and change can 
be to a society (Ferguson, 2006). Ferguson specifically talked about the issues of 
instability brought on by ethnic variance and economic decline, among other things. The 
structural and functional changes, subsequently, greatly influenced the common opinion 
that the overall power achieved by the society was indirectly related to their ability to 
expand their wealth and social esteem perception bases. In other words, if the city-state 
prospered materially, it obviously was prospering and (overall) simultaneously 
experiencing the successes of humanistic growth (Spielvogel, 2002).  
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With the growth of markets and societies came the need for refined legislation. 
The rules of conduct established by the people, for the people, increasingly began to not 
feel as such. Rules principally expected to observe and enforce unvarying justice, began 
apparently to diminish the liberties and opportunities of those they stood to protect. With 
the coming of globalization, the “sovereign state” would no longer seek to “promote its 
interest as defined by its governing elite” (Keylor, 2009). 
Optimally, a sound, stable, and fair rule of law should apply equally to all citizens 
residing within their respective nation-state system. However, the administration of just 
and equitable rule of law has arguably been a point of failure across the spectrum of 
stable, failing, and failed nation-states alike. Plato wrote, “where the law is subject to 
some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not 
far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then 
the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a 
state” (Cooper, 1997). When a nation’s law is driven by corruption or some other socially 
diminishing influence, its resulting state or condition is the inevitable lose of its power 
and functionality. From this point, the citizens begin to lose trust and allegiance in the 
degraded social system as a whole, subsequently developing into a situation of ultimate 
unrest. As a final result, the probability of rebellion within this degraded state becomes 
more of a certainty as historically witnessed in many countries (i.e., Peru and Sierra 
Leone), as discussed in the next chapter. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. PERU: EXAMPLE OF CIVIL DISAPPROVAL/AGGRESSION AS 
FACTOR OF TERRORIST NETWORKING AND NATION INSTABILITY 
In Peru, one can see that the disapproval of processes leading to inadequate and 
inequitable socio-political structures and vastly uneven capital/land distribution have 
historically been known to reveal and give rise to organizations, such as the Maoist 
guerrilla organization, the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. The belief of the Shining 
Path was that by its imposition of a dictatorship on Peru, it would merge the capitalist 
class society and the classless communist society into a transitional socialist state. 
Ultimately, civil frustration and subsequent aggression within the various cultures of Peru 
predominated (State of Fear Video and Lecture, November 30, 2009, December 2, 2009).  
Baron and Byrne discuss social and personal factors and the related levels of 
satisfaction regarding their investigated perspectives of aggression. Baron and Byrne 
(2000) state, “…aggression stems mainly from an externally elicited drive…” (p. 443). 
This theory suggests that circumstances outside of an individual’s control “can arouse a 
strong motive” and lead “…to overt acts of aggression” (Baron & Byrne, 2000, p. 443).  
Baron and Byrne (2000) also discuss the importance of social influence. They 
define social influence as “the efforts by one or more individuals to change the attitudes, 
beliefs, perceptions, or behaviors of one or more others. (p. 356). They argue that the 
phenomenon of social intrusiveness is a fact of life that is common among all walks of 
life. The type of commonality shared here contributes to forming the requisite 
homogenous system of values needed to establish credibility of the Shining Path’s 
structural make-up. The organization originally solicited the support of the population, 
which however, gave way to a subsequent evolution of indiscriminate acts of violence 
from the 1960s (TRC Conclusions, pp. 243–258).  
The commonalities shared by the citizens of the peasant class (i.e., culture, 
language, location, and conditions) were of significant importance considering the fact 
that Peru officially recognizes American Indian, European, African, and Asian ethnic 
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groups all speaking variations of the Spanish language with diverse cultures (WikiPeru, 
2009). The Shining Path used these commonalities to its advantage regarding formation 
and recruiting. The TRC established “that there was a significant relationship between 
poverty and social exclusion and the probability of becoming a victim of violence (TRC 
Conclusions, pp. 243–258). The Shining Path was able to form and grow largely due to 
its ability to remain “out of the public view” in the “remote and isolated” Ayacucho or 
“high-land Peru,” from an accessible university setting consisting of scholars (some with 
political agendas), amongst peasants suffering from extreme poverty, with their leader, 
Guzman, having a strong relationship with China, ripe conditions for volunteers, and a 
quest to “secure military resources to sustain the peoples war” (Palmer, 2007). More than 
40 percent of the deaths and disappearances reported to the TRC are concentrated in the 
Andean department of Ayacucho” (Palmer, 2007).  
The state’s military was at a disadvantage at the onset when it deployed to the 
countryside not yielding the general capacity to understand the peasant class’ language. 
These language comprehension deficiencies drastically hindered the state’s intelligence 
gathering operations. Both state and counter-state (Shining Path) actors were vying to 
develop the necessary influence over the population; thereby, swaying the population’s 
actions to support its respective cause. Ultimately, the longer the population remains in a 
state of irresolution, the higher their tendency to behave or react violently or erratically, 
and thus, statehood failure results.  
Bruce Porter discusses how modern warfare “helped democratize political life 
over the long run.” Porter elaborates further on how war is both a “destructive” and 
“cooperative” phenomenon. The violent behavior or warring of the Peruvian population 
as previously stated would initially have the affect of fostering “equality and collectivist 
politics” occurring “only after civil society was strong enough to force political leaders 




To the contrary, it is necessary to be careful when considering the causes of the 
Shining Path’s commission of acts of terrorism strictly limiting its origins to the obvious 
external factors (i.e., poverty). Although the homogeneous aspects of Peru’s external 
factors are important when investigating the causes of terrorism, some argue that they, by 
far, are not the only conditions from which terrorism arises.  
Audrey Cronin, in fact, argues that there “is no definitive study for the causes of 
terrorism” but provides explanation for the “research gap” (Cronin, pp. 20–21). Cronin 
states that it is “impossible to control enough of the potential variables involved to isolate 
and study only a few” (Cronin, pp. 20–21). She places, in some cases at least, “partial” 
emphasis on terrorism as “a reaction to the particular political, economic, and historical 
context within which potential terrorists exist;” as being a result of the “strategic decision 
of political actors; that different types of terrorism may be caused (or enabled) by 
different factors; and the preferences of the analyst” (Cronin, pp. 20–21). This being said, 
Cronin states the importance of a “clear understanding of the sources of” contemporary 
terrorism thorough the execution of the “four levels of analysis:” Level One: The Role of 
the Individual, Level Two: The Group or Organization, Level Three: The Role of The 
State, and Level Four: The International System. Ultimately, Cronin asserts that many 
factors come into play when trying to establish the how and whys of the causes of 
terrorism. Remaining objective and understanding the historical context of the terrorist 
organization’s narrative is vital to establishing relevant, useful, and accurate explanations 
(Cronin, pp. 23–35).  
The formula that Leites and Wolf provide concerning the “emergence of growth” 
of an insurgency and/or civil unrest supports the tenants of social influence theory. Leites 
and Wolf state, “the environment of a typically less developed country provides the 
market for” unrest and/or insurgency. “The many deep grievances, frictions, and 
hostilities that pervade this environment, combined with its social and economic 
disjointedness and the resources available—including time and effort—for commitment 




among insurgency infrastructure growth (Leites & Wolf, 1970). Simply put, people are 
products of their environments and each choice is a function of whatever that 
environment may be/or have been.  
Leites & Wolf’s previously stated assertion is made clear regarding the origins of 
the Irish conflict and its deeply seeded grievances and hostilities. These grievances and 
hostilities stem all the way back to “the 1920s when the island was partitioned, and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland believed that they were on the wrong side of that border,” 
consequently believing “that they had been done out of their political heritage…” 
(Arthur; Frontline, pp. 1–46). The Protestants, however, believed rights went back to the 
“Plantation of Ulster” in the 1600s, where they managed to maintain control despite the 
fact that they had lost control of the remainder of Ireland (Arthur; Frontline, pp. 1–46). 
Here, two “victim’s… clashing” sense of history are used to “justify” their conflicts “in 
the present” (Arthur; Frontline, pp. 1–46). The collapse of the civil rights campaign in the 
1960s gave way to “more demands for greater violence and then greater vigilance” 
setting the stage for a “civil war between Loyalists and Republicans” (Arthur; Frontline, 
pp. 1–46). The already weak political process in Northern Ireland “disappeared” leading 
to the rush to militancy, which subsequently, was the key for those who commanded the 
agenda (Arthur; Frontline, pp. 1–46) in the region. As it stood, the disintegration of 
political/democratic process led to militancy and violence, which could be seen as a 
social adaptation to the environment. 
B. SIERRA LEONE: DIAMOND POLICY ROLE IN CIVIL 
DISAPPROVAL/AGGRESSION AS FACTOR OF DESTABILIZATION 
The civil war in Sierra Leone spanning from 1991 through 2002 is another such 
case of a relatively small nation left with “tens of thousands of deaths” and over “two 
million” displaced citizens (CIA Factbook, 2009). Much has changed since those horrific 
times; however, much remains the same; even arguably so, in many ways, 
(characteristically) the nation may have gotten worse. Although Sierra Leone’s military 
has fully taken over security responsibilities since the U.N. left the country in 2005, the 
nation still has a long way to go regarding the issues of infrastructure development and 
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the suspension of rampant corruption throughout (CIA Factbook, 2009). The 
administration’s failure to preserve existing social contracts regarding regulation/law 
enforcement and civil-security has been a point of contention; consequentially, serving 
greatly in delegitimizing many of Sierra Leone’s efforts to stabilize the nation 
successfully.  
Since the late 1970s, Sierra Leone’s diamond mining industry has contributed 
greatly to continued unrest and subsequent destabilization (USAID, 2001). This analysis 
provides a better understanding of the characteristics of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining 
policy and the role it played in the nation’s destabilization. The transnational implication 
is that the international community shares the need to ensure foreign and security policy 
goals are met for the future economic security of all nations for generations to come. This 
case further explores the policy implications of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining industry 
as they relate to the effective governance of the country and subsequent nation stability.  
Yet an additional contributor to nation destabilization, and the policy focus of this 
case study, is primarily on the governance of diamond-mining countries in Africa against 
corruption is the Kimberly Process. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS), is a certification process introduced by United Nations Resolution 55/56 that 
was designed to identify the origin of rough diamonds, which are “free of conflict fueled 
by diamond production” (DiamondFacts, 2009). It was established in 2003 to stop the 
mainstream flow of the rough diamond market and to disable rebel group activities (i.e., 
war and human rights abuses) financed through diamond sales (DiamondFacts, 2009). 
The countries to be examined in this research are Botswana and Liberia. Given the scope 
of this assignment, the author only recommends that policy makers further research 
effects of visceral anti-De Beers campaigns on transparency (MNC-De Beers), as well as 
the mutual interdependent nature of mining extraction companies and the Private Military 
Company (PMC) sector’s adverse effect on Sierra Leone’s legitimacy and held monopoly 
on the use of force.  
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1. Population/Labor Force Controls 
Land in Sierra Leone is geographically very difficult to govern uniformly and 
tribal leaders often take advantage of this fact (USAID, 2001). As land is communally 
owned in Sierra Leone, but dictated by the tribal chiefs, it may be pragmatically 
integrated into governance measures often as a means for the rural governing elites to 
utilize nondemocratic methods to control the workers, profits, and development of the 
respective society (USAID, 2001). As a whole, citizens relatively ignorant of their rights 
perceive that governing institutions generally make provisions to mitigate their concerns 
for the preservation of basic needs within a social structure. Their typical tendency is 
uniformly to remain amicable to the conditions as set by governing policies of the 
Chiefdom’s administration (USAID, 2001, p. 8). Simply, many regimes understand that 
people (generally) tend to go with the flow when they are basically content, and thus, 
strive ultimately to influence citizen’s “conspiring” to create systems of “virtual 
servitude” over time (USAID, 2001, p. 8). 
Societies like Sierra Leone prone to continuous resource mismanagement, 
rampant violations of civil liberties, and little resolution of grievances; become 
increasingly dissatisfied. This instance has been historically seen in many nation-states 
fouled with corrupt and inadequate leadership, such as Sierra Leone (USAID, 2001, p. 8). 
Civil support of incumbent leaders transitioned to the growth and maintenance of 
rebellions with subsequent acts of extreme violence and terror. However, before 
investigating the evolution of civil-regime commitment, it is first necessary to define 
democracy and how it relates. 
2.  Democratic Type Governance Structures 
Sierra Leone’s government type is a constitutional democracy (CIA Factbook, 
2009). A democracy is defined as either a political government executed by the people 
(direct democracy) or the power to govern is granted to the elected representatives 
(representative democracy) (WikiDemoracy, 2009). Utilizing their global model to 
identify factors associated with the risk of all types of state failure in all countries, the 
State Failure Task Force (SFTF) found that “the strongest influence on the risk of state 
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failure” was regime type (SFTF, 2000). Additionally, the task force also found “the odds 
of state failure to be seven times as high for partial democracies as they were for full 
democracies and autocracies” (full democracies and autocracies have roughly equivalent 
odds of failing) (SFTF, 2000, p. 34). Full democracies/autocracies typically have stronger 
leaders and more effective legislatures than countries with partial democracies. The 
adequate governance of chiefdoms can present issues in some parts of Sierra Leone due 
to their geographically challenging locations. Tribal chiefs are often corrupt and unfair 
advocating uneven wealth/property distribution and other fraudulent policies and 
institutional procedures. SFTF reports that effective lawmaking legislature’s capabilities 
and “executive constraining” powers are the most discernible differences between the 
characteristics of full and partial democracies (SFTF, 2000, p. 36). 
Arguably, social contracts are often not met by the broken regime of partial 
democratic structured governments. Citizens become increasingly frustrated, displeased, 
and ultimately, become detached from their perceived responsibilities to the regime’s 
administration. Feelings of indignation begin to arise as society develops feelings of 
having been wronged. When the administration’s formal grievance process is tested and 
found to be inadequate, civil unrest occurs; further placing strain on the regime’s already 
diminishing capacity. As capacities fail, frustrated social groups begin to resort to taking 
independent or group action outside of the law. Civil unrest may further escalate into 
committing acts of terror as a means of coercing the sought after change. An evolution of 
citizen approval and disapproval of regime follows to depict this assertion further. 
3. Mining and Operational Effects on Sierra Leone Stability 
Governing regulations in Sierra Leone for the mining of diamonds are the 
Kimberly Process and Mines and Minerals Acts of 1994 and 2003 (adding specific 
penalties). Mining administration, field monitoring, and licensing are governed by the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources. The Kimberly Process focuses on the external or 
international implications of the problem. The licenses recognized by the Mines and 
Minerals Act are exploration, mining, exclusive prospecting, and non-exclusive 
prospecting. Sierra Leonean citizens are the only people that can be issued artisanal 
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mining licenses. All miners, dealers, and exporters are required to obtain licenses from 
the Director of Mines. Miners may only sell diamonds legally to licensed dealers or 
exporters and dealers may sell only to exporters. Mines monitoring officers and mine 
wardens monitor through the field system of their respect office (Coakley, 2004). 
The Banking Act of 2000 was enacted by Parliament to facilitate new export and 
valuation procedures and “the Bank of Sierra Leone issued new regulations in 2001” 
(Coakley, 2004). The responsibilities of diamond trade control requirements as set forth 
by The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS) were transferred from the 
Government Gold and Diamond Office of the Ministry of Mineral Resources to the 
“Gold and Diamond Department of the National Revenue Authority” in 2004 to 
implement Sierra Leone’s “participation and compliance with” the international standards 
(Coakley, 2004). Also, to promote foreign investment, the Parliament passed a new 
“Investment Promotion Act” in August of 2004 (Sierra Leone Parliament, 2005). 
Bo, Bombali, Bonthe, Kailahun, Kambia, Kenema, Koinadugu, Kono, Moyamba, 
Port Loko, Pujehun, and Tonkolili are the only government recognized chiefdoms in 
Sierra Leone. Chiefdom mining allocation committees were created to screen license 
holders prior to their application submittals to the Ministry. This process was enacted to 
address the issue of outside artisanal and small-scale miners “gaining access to mining 
licenses of Chieftaincy lands” (Coakley, 2004). Slowly but surely, Sierra Leone and the 
International community appear to be working towards its stability.  
Although geographic issues present challenges to governance in rural areas; 
internationally, the Kimberly process is generally doing well. In general, it is forcing the 
legal channeling of diamonds into legitimate regulatory institutions, such as the 
Government Gold & Diamond Office (GG&DO). This channeling enables an increase in 
accountability procedures, adequate taxation, and greater generation of revenue and 
subsequent collections for the government. These increased revenues in turn can be 
utilized for community capacity building. Arguably, the greater and more affective the 
capacity building efforts, the greater the tendency towards state institutional legitimacy 
and lasting stability (Maconachie, 2008). 
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Sierra Leone and other nations should thoroughly review and understand this fact 
when making its policy and strategy regarding diamond mining as it relates to regime 
consistency, effectiveness, organized revolt and acts of violence. Corrupt regimes leaders 
continuously attempt to impose upon and solidify controlling relationships over the 
people. All the while, these corrupt elites continue to manipulate equality for their own 
benefit, such as with Sierra Leone’s tribal chiefs and citizens. A prudent look at the 
history can tell them where they have been; however, a look at areas where successful 
governance is traditionally expected regarding the provision of basic human needs can be 
a start for a plan for the future. 
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V. CONSEQUENCES 
A. INADEQUATE AND INEQUITABLE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES 
LEADING TO MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORIST NETWORKING 
AND SUBSEQUENT STATE INSTABILITY 
This thesis has established that the quality of a state’s socio-political structure 
invariably contributes to the soundness of the basic installations, facilities, and services 
on which that state’s continuance and growth urgently depends. Examples of such 
structures include transportation, educational facilities, communication systems, 
electricity, and roads. When installations, facilities, and services fail the citizens by not 
meeting their needs, these inhabitants begin to find alternative ways, outside of legitimate 
systems, to meet their respective requirements. Less developed countries that than those 
with stronger infrastructures may tend to have weaker policy and enforcement 
mechanisms in place. These policies and enforcement mechanisms most often render the 
incumbent administration deficient or negligent regarding the adequate execution and 
management of its institutional affairs. Bryan Walsh describes the decline of this type 
administration’s ability to regulate itself as reaching its “tipping point” (Walsh, 2007). 
Walsh describes tipping points as “the levels at which the momentum for change 
becomes unstoppable” (Walsh, 2007). The context of the author’s analogy is that the 
institution reaches its threshold after being in a state of decline for so long that its own 
collapse is imminent given the constructs of the infrastructure’s neglect and/or criminal 
activity that led it to decline in the first place.  
Additionally, note how organized crime and/or terrorist leaders can play a 
significant role, and even benefit, from an administration’s collapse utilizing Malcom 
Gladwell’s general theory and premise regarding influence (Gladwell, 2000). Effectively, 
the institution fails in its duty or obligation of adequately assisting the citizens in meeting 
their basic needs requirements by failing to managing social order requirements in that 
particular community. Overall, the failing institution begins to lose social support, 
reliance, and thus, legitimacy.  
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Further contributing to the weakening of the social infrastructure is the criminal 
element’s progressive exploitation of the fact that illegal activities are not clearly or 
uniformly defined within weak social systems. The law, under these circumstances, is 
then subjected to exploitation and taken out of context by both criminals and law-abiding 
citizens alike. Clear and enforceable legal instruments and systems provide a framework 
for law-abiding citizens to follow in society, which protects their liberties. A major 
concern here is essentially the existence of a lack of clear perception and consensus 
regarding what is right and wrong among the people. Legal instruments are deemed 
legitimate when they are generally fair and equitable across the spectrum of the social 
systems in which they are employed to protect. These legal instruments are in place to 
uphold the law, and ultimately, limit losses regarding the general liberties of the citizens. 
However, when the regulations/laws that are in place are unclear, criminal activity begins 
to emerge. Criminals take advantage of the weak regulations by making unethical use of 
these flawed regulations for their own advantage and profit. Weak regulations cloud 
social progress by creating ambiguity regarding what is legal or illegal conduct. Given 
the provisions of the previous assertions, one can begin to conclude that living in 
societies with weak infrastructural capacity coupled with unclearly defined rules and 
regulations within that society, creates various problems for that society. Historically, 
when governing administrations allow social contracts to fail regarding provisions for the 
people, the general population may begin to succumb to the influences of the criminal 
element, as well as the social conditions that have degraded their infrastructure in the first 
place. Resultant of the prevailing circumstances, the citizens increasingly begin to press 
the threshold of legal activity until, ultimately, they begin to disregard the legitimacy of 
the law altogether. At this point, existing laws become just barely enough to be perceived 
by the citizens, with little or no strength to prevent marginal or criminal activity (Walsh, 
2007). Criminal activities that thrive under these conditions often consist of financial 
crimes, such as money laundering. 
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B. MONEY LAUNDERING 
Money laundering is the movement of various forms of funds produced from 
“illegal activities through legitimate financial institutions and businesses to conceal the 
source of the funds” (IFAC, 2004). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
defines money laundering as “the criminal practice of filtering ill-gotten gains or “dirty” 
money through a series of transactions, so that the funds are “cleaned” to look like 
proceeds from legal activities” (OCC, 2002). They further discuss how money laundering 
is kept in force by criminal activities, and subsequently, “conceals the true source, 
ownership, or use of funds” (OCC, 2002). 
The issue of money laundering has continued to develop over the years involving 
some significant changes. With the development of instruments and services provided by 
the financial sector and its institutions, come potentially greater opportunities for drug 
dealing, trafficking, and other serious criminal offenses adequate channels for their 
operations/activities (IFAC, 2004).  
The OCC describes the three steps of money laundering as being: “1) 
Placement—placing, through deposits or other means, unlawful proceeds into the 
financial system, 2) Layering—separating proceeds of criminal activity from their origin 
through the use of layers of complex financial transactions, and 3) Integration—using 
additional transactions to create the appearance of legality through the purchase of assets” 
(OCC, 2002). 
Measures implementing checks to verify and preempt issues of noncompliance 
are imperative to a healthy anti-money laundering program (OCC, 2002). This program 
should monitor risks associated with transactions and reputation, as well as include 
“opening controls and the monitoring and reporting of suspicious activity” (OCC, 2002). 
By ensuring that financial regulatory standards of compliance are being met through 
continual comparison of these programs with the highest anti-money laundering 
prevention measures and standards, legitimate institutions can potentially moderate their 
long-term profit losses by remaining on track by use of healthy regulatory practices.  
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Further, the financial sector can mitigate unwanted “exposures” to activities that enable 
money laundering, terrorist financing, and subsequent socio-economic infrastructural 
destabilization (OCC, 2002). 
C. EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND RISE OF ORGANIZED 
CRIME IN RUSSIA 
From times of its accelerated agricultural and industrial productivity, to its 
political and economic reforms in 1980s, to its present times of continued stability 
initiatives structured towards international growth, Russia has dealt with the debilitating 
effects of money laundering. Assertions have been made that the political and economic 
reconstruction efforts of the late 1980s associated with Perestroika (“restructuring”) 
caused Russia’s collapse (Rempel, 1996). Perestroika was a said to have been responsible 
for the end of the Cold War (Heuvel & Cohen, 2009). In short, the Gorbachev 
administration’s initiative to reform the political and economic foundation and create a 
new, stronger Russia, failed. With strict government controls remaining over Russia’s 
primary means of production, decentralization of government with remaining 
governmental price controls, prevention of private party ownership, the inconvertibility 
of the ruble, and other factors, Russia had virtually lost all control over its financial 
conditions and drastically exhausted both political and economic consistency. This 
virtually ruined the central governing body’s capacity to control the state. Arguably, a 
top-down planning approach with little foresight was taken by the administration when 
reforming essential political and economic policy. Corruption rose and former 
government officials profited significantly (Pointkovsky, 2009). Pointkovsky comments 
on the post-Perestroika governmental structure with his statement, “we would say that 
today's Central Committee members, secretaries of regional committees and KGB 
Generals (whatever their titles may be now) have become multi-millionaires in dollar 
terms. Modern ‘politburo members' have become multi-billionaires” (Pointkovsky, 
2009). The assertion here is that with prior connections from their previous positions, 




poorer. Corruption flourished and the accelerated emergence of economic disaster proved 
to facilitate the malignantly uncontrollable rise, demand, and utility of organized crime 
significantly throughout the country (Pointkovsky, 2009). 
D. BRIEF COMPARISON OF RUSSIA’S PERESTROIKA TO CHINA’S 
DENG XIAOPING’S ECONOMIC REFORMS 
A brief comparison of Russia’s Perestroika to China’s Deng Xiaoping economic 
reforms provides an estimation of the similarities and differences between the two 
communist states. As a general rule of thumb, a regime’s administrative infrastructure 
should, arguably, be placed into some level of review on a regular basis to make the 
social systems more efficient by ending abuses or malpractices within those respective 
regimes. Upon completion of such a regular review process, a refinement and subsequent 
introduction of improved policies and procedures should be put into place that reflect the 
current social and institutional demands and requirements to meet the countries basic 
functional needs adequately. 
The origins of both Russia and China’s reform periods spanned from late 1970s to 
present day. Not only were the times of the two nation’s reform periods similar, but they 
were both communist regimes as well. Both China and Russia were adamant about 
improving its respective societies by attempting to modernize their economies.  
Key focuses of Russia’s reconstruction regarding its economic and political 
systems included political liberalization through multi-candidate (“but not multi-party”), 
“elections for local Communist Party (CPSU) and Soviets, “meaningful” changes of 
government structures, such as the formation of a Congress of People’s Deputies, 
dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, and a reservation of one-third of the parliamentary 
seats to ensure communist majority (WikiPeristroika, 2010). Another key factor of 
Russia’s reform period was the enactment of the Law of Cooperatives. This law allowed 
the private sector to own businesses in the manufacturing, services, and foreign-trade 




question here (WikiPeristroika, 2010). In the end, the framework was not in place to 
support failing business and the government was called on to alleviate their economic 
failures (WikiPeristroika, 2010).  
The primary objective of the Chinese reconstruction period was to “generate 
sufficient surplus value to finance the modernization of the mainland Chinese economy” 
(WikiChinaEconomicReform, 2010). Key focuses of China’s reconstruction efforts 
regarding its economic and political systems included an appeal intended to motivate 
“workers and farmers” to “produce” large agricultural surpluses and to “eliminate” 
economic imbalance that had historically been “common in command economies” 
(WikiChinaEconomicReform, 2010).  
Both countries’ reform initiatives had significant impacts on various areas of their 
respective socio-political and economic systems; however, China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) consistently grew while Russia’s GDP fell since inception 
(WikiRussia&China, 2010).  
E. MONEY LAUNDERING CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA  
John Walker’s global money laundering assessment in 1998 provided that Russia 
ranked third in the following three categories: top 20 origins, flows, and destinations of 
laundered money (Walker, 1998). These statistics leave no question as to why the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) placed Russia on the “tax 
havens” blacklist for the country’s susceptibility to financial crimes due to its inadequate 
money laundering prevention measures (Minaeva & Aksenova, 2007). 
In his journal article regarding a publication analyzing political reform in Russia, 
India, and China, Jack Reardon discusses how the “dismantling” of the Soviet state and 
privatization of resources led to the spontaneous rise of a market economy in Russia 
(Reardon, 2004). The decentralization caused by Perestroika subsequently led to 
unprecedented bottlenecking instead of its intended streamlining of the system. 
Following poor spending practices, Russia’s central government continued to support 
unproductive businesses and other poor fiscal practices. Local governments ultimately  
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began to withhold tax revenues. Finally, the accumulation of its failed circumstances 
further led to the breakdown of traditional supply and demand relationships without the 
formulation of new, more productive ones (Wiki Perestroika, 2010). 
Since the late 1980s and 1990s, Russia has come a long way. The country’s 2001 
ratification of the “Counsel of Europe Convention on Laundering, Tracing, Seizing and 
Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime (1990 Convention) played a very important role in 
leading the way for Russian initiatives created to hold financial institutions responsible 
for financial crimes, such as money laundering (Minaeva & Aksenova, 2007). This 
initiative nationalized money laundering legislation, which transferred ownership or 
control of money laundering agenda to the government at large. Russia now had the 
authority, as a whole, to employ the full extent of its resources (within legal bounds) to 
nationally impose and enforce money-laundering initiatives (Minaeva & Aksenova, 
2007). 
However, the tremendous positive impact of Russia’s nationalized anti-money 
laundering legislation is often overshadowed by, at minimum, a few significant factors: 
1) that it lacks the rigid, basic structure(s) necessary to handle higher levels of corruption 
and “organized crime prevention and deficiencies in the Money Laundering Law” itself 
(overburdening banks and its operations, 2) the lack of “clear definitions” in the Money 
Laundering Law overall, and 3) employee training regiments are often inefficient, and 
thus, ineffective against money laundering (Minaeva & Aksenova, 2007). The lack of 
clear definitions, infrastructural capacity, employee education, institutional coordination 
of technological tracking and communications all often leave room for the criminal 
element and noncriminal element alike, to misinterpret and exploit the financial systems, 
and subsequently, the policies in place to prevent such criminal activities (Minaeva & 
Aksenova, 2007).  
Given all the limitations of Russia’s policy, infrastructure capacity in preventing 
corruption is arguably one of its largest problems for the future. Transparency 
International provides various survey and indices for consumers to review and analyze. 
Its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) presents a country’s ranking, score, and various 
other criteria to determine the confidence of a particular country’s level of corruption for 
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the survey’s reporting period with a 90% confidence rating. Based upon the 2009 results, 
Russia is ranked 146th out of 180 countries in corruptness (Transparency International, 
2009).  
F. KEY FINANCIAL SECTOR AND TERRORIST FINANCING 
LEGISLATION  
Many may see counter anti-money laundering initiatives as a host of seemingly 
unmanageable contentions between law enforcement/regulatory bodies and collective 
criminal element as a whole. Implications associated with the preceding statement are 
only true in part. Citizens have an obligation to support those systems devised to 
withstand the perpetually debilitating conditions placed upon them by the tireless attacks 
of the criminal element. The quality of the systems put in place to protect institutions and 
subsequent liberties against criminal attack, is only as effective as the level of support. 
Through the support of many law abiding advocates of anti-money laundering and 
terrorist financing initiatives, the U.S. government has “imposed many legislative and 
regulatory standards” to prevent and discourage money laundering at large (Transparency 
International, 2009). The OCC reports the most significantly impacting of these standards 
as being “the most significant of these are: the Bank Secrecy Act (Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970); the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986; the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; Section 2532 of the Crime Control Act of 1990; Section 
206 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; the 
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (Title XV of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1992); the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (Title IV of 
the Riegle-Neal Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994); 
the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998; and the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Title III, International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Act of 2001)” (Transparency International, 2009). 
The scope of these legislative and regulatory standards ranges from fighting drug 
and human trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes; enhancing existing 
initiatives by making certain violations criminal and federal offenses; reinforcement 
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through increased sanctions and penalties; empowering federal banking systems to work 
with foreign banking authorities; allowing supervisory authorities greater latitude in 
regards to accessing banking information; development of advanced examination 
procedures, government authority to combat international terrorism (Transparency 
International, 2009). 
 40
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
VI. COUNTERMEASURES 
A. UNDERMINING TERRORIST NETWORKS AND MONEY 
LAUNDERING SCHEMES 
“In the Information Age, they ask, how do you attack, degrade or destroy a small, 
shadowy, globally distributed, stateless network of intensely loyal partisans with few 
fixed assets or addresses?” (Garreau, 2001). In this question posed by the Garreau group, 
the group provides its comparison of the decisional concerns of wars past and present as 
they relate to how to undermine the critical momentum points necessary to disrupt 
various networks. Garreau argues his point that utilizing, for instance, a bomber to deal 
with a “symmetrical” threat in past wars was an adequate combat response to a “toe to 
toe” battle between symmetric industrial powers “throwing steel” at each other (Garreau, 
2001). These tactics may have been effective for that particular time and under those 
circumstances; however, against the asymmetrical networks of today’s terrorist groups, 
this method has proven historically to be ineffective. 
Although, smaller terrorist networks cannot withstand the brute combat power 
and tremendous logistical sustainment capacities of today’s conventional fighting forces, 
one can clearly see the many modes/methods utilized by terrorist networks and their 
decision to maintain its asymmetric organizational structure has proven to be a useful 
tool. It is necessary to understand briefly the characteristic organization or nature of the 
terrorist network to undermine its operations. Similarly and understood (generally by 
many if not most), terrorist groups exhibit high capacities for mobility, tend to behave (or 
are capable of) acting to sustained acts of extreme acts of violence for their respective 
ideology, tend to have relatively various extremes and schemes of social and economic 
supporters and sympathizers, are highly or technically skilled, informed, and able to 
recruit sufficiently to accomplish its mission, to say the least. 
Garreau makes the assertion that human networks are “political and emotional 
connections among people who must trust each other in order to function” (Garreau, 
2001). By his assertion that emotions are people’s respective internal state and are 
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subjective, relatively involuntary and physiological in nature, one can proceed to 
conclude that emotions are predominated by a response to a specific situation or object. 
By indirectly manipulating these variables, the author asserts that one can manipulate an 
individual’s emotions. Subsequently, if emotions are significant contributors and 
motivations to actions, by manipulating the variables that affect change in one’s 
emotional state, it is possible to can bring about variable changes within the human 
network systems. For the purpose of this thesis, the author argues that finances are 
significant factors, that when depleted, can disrupt the emotional state, and subsequent 
human network system as a whole. 
Previous points being made, and in light of their functional character traits of 
terrorist (human) networks as a whole, the author  argues that developing, implementing, 
and enforcing stringent anti-money laundering policies and procedures tremendously 
hinders the capacity for terrorist networks to operate, and in many cases, to exist all 
together. Earlier mention of the conventional force’s ability to amass a larger number of 
forces and move sustained and unprecedented metric tons (of gear and equipment), 
through its logistical component, prefaces his point that none of these logistical capacities 
can be achieved if financing for these components failed to exist. Terrorist networks, 
although they may take relatively little financing to operate in many instances, take 
sustained financing (which varies dependent upon the respective objective) to bring these 
objectives to fruition the same as its larger, more conventional counterpart’s operations.  
Uniforms, gear, equipment, transportation, food, explosives, training, and 
information, all present some monetary cost to the terrorist network and should be 
accounted for in every planning evolution, and for every mission objective. Ultimately, 
sustaining the influx of financing is critical to the terrorist network is critical. When the 
finances of terrorists are ill gotten through illicit means or are irregular in nature and are 
placed within legitimate financial systems, and these financial systems adhere to their 
respective anti-money laundering directives, most of the sources that can be detected, can 




detected if conspicuously placed within legitimate financial institutions as they exist 
today. By disrupting these funds, officials can indirectly impact the emotional state, and 
subsequent motivations for that human network to act in general. 
B. FORTIFYING DEMOCRACIES AND COUNTERING TERRORISTS 
Countermeasures for consideration for democratic-type regimes that are not full 
democracies can consist of: 1) not viewing every reversal of democracy as a major 
setback, learn from the experience and a lot time for growth; 2) when reviewing policy 
options for democratic material well-being and good governance/legislative options, 
consider all possible risk-factors; 3) ensure the legislature has effective law-making 
capacity and thorough controls of executive powers; 4) continuously consider robust 
dispute resolution mechanism commensurate with prevalent social demands; and 5) 
overall, ensure regime administration maintains vigilant observation programs to watch 
over consistency of the democracy (SFTF, 2000). 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In closing, regardless of whether society wants to admit its existence, a 
relationship exists between needs, attitude, democratic regimes, nation stability, financial 
crimes, and terrorist action. These characteristics should be thoroughly reviewed and 
understood when making policy and strategy regarding regime consistency and 
effectiveness as it relates to organized revolt, acts of money laundering and terror actions.  
Various strains of socio-economic and political factors can lead to collusive acts, 
such as money laundering, and illicit activities by criminals and terrorist groups. Again, 
the author asserts that the world can witness the development of fewer terrorist networks, 
as well as fewer of these acts if every country were an established and functioning 
democracy because the these democracies arguably allow for better governing and 
facilitate systems of economic prosperity.  
Restating the author’s purpose of analyzing various destabilizing contributors to 
nation instability, one can conclude through these findings that there is a continued need 
to analyze these factors. The international community, as a whole, must contribute 
wholeheartedly with a commitment to the long-term of the nation stability agenda. These 
previously mentioned factors would contribute greatly to the cause and suitably help 
address U.S. and international community concerns regarding the transnational need for 
adequate understanding of the characteristics of failed nation-states. By focusing on 
specific nation-state destabilizing factors, such as money laundering, etc., one can 
ascertain from these findings how terrorist and other illicit criminals could potentially 
continue to exploit the weaknesses in a government system, further accelerating the 
degradation of its social, economic and political consistency and subsequent stability, if 
left unchecked. One can also generally ascertain as to which regime type most suitably 
contributes to the rise, growth, and sustainment of various illicit activities utilized by 
terrorist and criminal organizations alike to take advantage of and weaken their 
infrastructures. 
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Democracies have historically exhibited more consistent and stable governments 
with greater civil compliance and less violent activity formally characterized as terrorism. 
Further, it is very important to be able to see the relationships and assertion to mitigate 
the many challenges that accompany any organized revolt threatening imminent terrorist 
action. Now is the time to look deeper ahead.  
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